Economic and Politico-Institutional Variables Applied to the Analysis of Subnational Public Speding in Argentina by Rezk, Ernesto
ISSN  0034-8066
R E EEVISTA CONOMÍA Y STADÍSTICADE
I E FNSTITUTO DE CONOMÍA Y INANZAS
F C EACULTAD DE IENCIAS CONÓMICAS
U N CNIVERSIDAD ACIONAL DE ÓRDOBA
La Revista de Economía y Estadística, se edita desde el año 1939. Es una publicación semestral del
Instituto de Economía y Finanzas (IEF), Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de
Córdoba,Av. Valparaíso s/n, Ciudad Universitaria. X5000HRV, Córdoba,Argentina.
Teléfono: 00 - 54 - 351 - 4437300 interno 253.
Contacto: rev_eco_estad@eco.unc.edu.ar
Dirección web http://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/REyE/index
REVISTAS
de la Universidad
Nacional de Córdoba
El es un espacio destinado a la difusión de lasPortal de Revistas de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
investigaciones realizadas por los miembros de la Universidad y a los contenidos académicos y culturales desarrollados
en las revistas electrónicas de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Considerando que la Ciencia es un recurso público, es
que la Universidad ofrece a toda la comunidad, el acceso libre de su producción científica, académica y cultural.
http://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/index
Instituto de
Economía
y Finanzas
Economic and Politico-Institutional Variables 
Applied to the Analysis of Subnational 
Public Speding inArgentina
Ernesto Rezk
Revista de Economía y Estadística, Cuarta Época, Vol. 46, No. 1 (2008), pp. 69-107.
http://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/REyE/article/view/3847
Rezk, E. (2008). Economic and Politico-Institutional VariablesApplied to theAnalysis of Subnational Public
Speding inArgentina. , Cuarta Época, Vol. 46, No. 1 (2008), pp. 69-107.Revista deEconomía yEstadística
Disponible en: <http://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/REyE/article/view/3847>
ARTÍCULOS
Cómo citar este documento:
Economic and Politico - Institutional
Variables Applied to the Analysis
of Subnational Public Speding in Argentina
ERNESTO REZK*•
Institute of Economics and Finance
Faculty of Economic Sciences
National University of Córdoba
ernerezk@eco.unc.edu.ar
Abstract
Using a panel data with fixed effect for the period 1993-2004, we aim
at ascertaining whether the participation of public expenditure catego-
ries in total public spending of Argentine provinces was influenced by
economic, fiscal and politico-institutional variables, such as provinces’
political sign; possibility of reelection of the executive branch;
provisions limiting public spending, public debt, or restrictions to the
use of credit; and the structure of the legislative bodies.
While estimated coefficients for fiscal effort, financial sufficiency, and
public debt were significantly different from zero, results fell short of
being conclusive for the other variables, except for categorical variables
standing for limits on spending and credit use.
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Resumen
El análisis econométrico realizado, en el marco de un modelo de datos de
panel con efectos fijos, para el período 1993-2004, tuvo el objetivo
de determinar si la participación de diversas categorías de gasto público
en el gasto público total de las provincias argentinas estuvo influida por
variables económicas, fiscales y político institucionales tales como
la posibilidad de reelección, normas que limitan el gasto público o el
endeudamiento o que condicionan el uso del crédito.
Mientras que los coeficientes de regresión estimados para el esfuerzo
fiscal, la suficiencia financiera y la deuda pública fueron significativamente
diferentes de cero, los resultados distaron de ser satisfactorios en el resto
de los casos, salvo por las variables que representaban límites impuestos
sobre el aumento del gasto o el uso del crédito público.
Palabras Clave: gasto público provincial, respondabilidad, autonomía y
suficiencia financiera, variables político institucionales, datos de panel
efectos fijos.
Clasificación JEL: H72 , H11
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the national constitution2, Argentina is a federal
country with three levels of government: the central one, the provinces and
the municipalities, each of which counts with fairly wide spending faculties
and the power of raising fiscal revenues. Likewise, there is a national revenue
sharing system whereby the central government transfers to the provinces
and the autonomous city of Buenos Aires nearly half of VAT, Income,
Personal Goods and Oil Taxes’ yield while, in turn, provinces transfer to
municipalities a part of what they collect in terms of Property and
Turnover Taxes and Stamp Duties.
The institutional framework clearly favours an inter jurisdictional
fiscal relationship in line with what R. Bird (1996) called Federal
Finances, closer to a public choice-like approach in which provinces are
constitutionally entitled to negotiate on a par with the central government,
since the 1853 Constitution and successive amendments reassure ample
fiscal and spending powers to provinces and municipalities and place in
provincial hands the responsibility of preserving the municipal autonomy
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1. By being a federal country, each of the 23 provinces and the autonomous city of Buenos
Aires have their own constitutions.
within their jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the actual relation between the
national government and the provinces –according to overwhelming
statistical evidences– points in a different direction in so far as it
shows that Argentina stands today as a centralized federation, in
which intergovernmental fiscal relations are better depicted by an Agency
Relationship in which the national government performs the role of the
Principal and provinces that of Agents3.
In analyzing reasons for that, Rezk, Capello and Ponce (1997)
pointed out the marked concentration of tax collection at the central level,
which in turn reflected the effective assignment and exercise –via the
Revenue Sharing System mainly4– of fiscal faculties in the country.
Suffice in this connection to mention that the central government, provinces
and municipalities respond at present for approximately 80%, 16% and 4%
respectively of collected total fiscal revenues.
In the expenditure side, and owing to a process of spending decen-
tralization dating from the nineties, provincial public spending amounts
now to more than 40% of all levels’ consolidated public spending, being
the provinces responsible for almost all Educational5 and Health
Expenditures and for a substantial share in Housing, Welfare and
Economic Expenditures. Nevertheless, and as mentioned above, the
decentralizing process highly relying on conditioned transfers (earmarked
funds represented in 2003 more than 35% of central government’s
transfers to provinces) not only fell short of exhibiting a devolving feature
but it did not either meet the 1994 constitutional amendment mandating
that transfers of competences, services and functions to provinces would
be effective only if the corresponding resource allocation6, approved by the
National Congress, and accepted by the provinces, occurred in due time.
Finally, the present secondary distribution of shared tax resources,
whose coefficients for each province were arbitrarily set by the Law
23548, on the basis of coefficients for 1988 resulting out of diverse
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3. A similar situation in turn occurs between provinces and local governments within the
provincial jurisdiction.
4. The point can not be plaid down of provinces’ lack of interest in using some other tax bases.
5. Except for the funds for national universities, which still remain as a part of the central
government budget.
6. It must be emphasized that this mandate basically sought to guarantee that transfers of
competences to provinces were accompanied by sufficient resources for the service’s effective
provision (in quantity and quality), which in fact did not occur when provinces were given the
total responsibility of running primary and secondary schools in their jurisdictions.
modifications in the existing Revenue Sharing Regime7, and the attitude of
provinces against deepening the use of their own tax sources, explain why
national transfers (either shared revenues or earmarked funds) range
between 75% and 95% of most provinces’ total resources8. An immediate
unwanted effect of this situation is the scarce accountability of the
government level in charge of spending given that the principle of financial
autonomy –upon which accountability in part rests, as the literature
stresses it– is far from being fulfilled, let alone difficulties in meeting also
the principle of financial sufficiency.
Following this line of reasoning, the paper’s main objective is to
empirically verify, for the 23 Argentine provinces and the autonomous city
of Buenos Aires, whether provincial spending categories’ share of total
public spending relate to the existing degrees of financial autonomy and
sufficiency. Assuming in turn that economic and budgetary variables are
also related to provincial public spending, the impact of the gross geographic
product, the stock of public debt and transfers upon spending will also be
assessed, the assumption being here that different reactions should
be expected from the diverse categories of public expenditure.
Likewise, and acknowledging debates reflected in the more recent
literature as to whether constitutional arrangements, or determined
politico-institutional situations, affected or were neutral with respect to
public spending level, the matter will be treated by resorting to categorical
and dummy variables standing for the following hypotheses: possibility
of reelection of provincial governors (and exercise of the right), provincial
political sign vis-à-vis that of the central government, constitutional limits
upon deficit spending, public debt and credit use (as opposed to the case in
which these limits do not exist) and unicameral vis-à-vis bicameral
provincial legislatures.
Results of the empirical analysis, obtained from a panel data
model, are valuable not only in that they permit to explain with econometric
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7. It is still pending the new Revenue Sharing Regime, notwithstanding that the 1994
Constitution set 31 December 1996 as the deadline for its approval by the Congress. The Regime
will have to be subject to a “convenio” law between the Congress and the provinces and it will
have to guarantee, among other requirements, the automatic fund remission to provinces.
8. The important weight of the four richest provinces (Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Santa Fe and
Mendoza) plus the autonomous city of Buenos Aires, places provinces´ own resources between
40% and 50% of total subnational revenues. It is worth mentioning however the total dependence
from national transfers of provinces such as Formosa, La Rioja, Catamarca, Santiago del Estero
and Jujuy.
fundaments and solvency the mechanics of expenditure and the fiscal
performance of Argentine provinces, but in clearing also the way to
conclusions with strong policy implications for economic recommendations,
on the basis of the combined contribution of economic and fiscal variables
and other variables standing for constitutional and politico-institutional
constraints.
As for the structure of the paper, Section II presents a brief survey
of recent articles related to the matter, Section III highlights some stylized
facts of provincial spending, Section IV develops the used econometric
methodology, Section V shows econometric estimations with panel data
and Section VI concludes.
II. BRIEF SURVEY OF THE RECENT LITERATURE
In a very interesting econometric study of 105 Spanish munici-
palities over 50,000 inhabitants, Bosch and Suárez-Pandiello (1995)
aimed at testing a set of seven hypotheses concerning the political and
financial behaviour of local governments in relation to their public
spending. The model constructed assumed a “democratically-based”
institutional system, political pluralism, electoral competition and authorities
whose performance and activities were directed towards the fundamental
objective of succeeding in being reelected.
By framing public choice and local public spending hypotheses
within an analytical model Bosch and Suárez-Pandiello held that ideology
was important, that political negotiations increased spending, that per capita
expenditure was higher the greater the population’s participation in elections,
that per capita local spending grew as local fiscal effort was enhanced, that
local spending was lower when the “political colour” of local and central
governments coincided9 and that a greater proportion of noticeable taxes
yielded a lesser per capita local public spending.
In testing the validity of held assumptions, the authors found
results significantly different from zero for the hypothesis that municipalities
largely financed with visible individual taxes tended to spend less,
whereas those local governments with greater financial liabilities (subject
also to the burden of interest payments) or ruled by political parties
without an absolute majority tended to spend relatively more.
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9. As will be mentioned below, this hypothesis had been earlier introduced by Alt and
Lowry (1994).
Unsatisfactory results were however found when the hypotheses somehow
linking the level of expenditure to the municipal fiscal effort, the ideological
sign, the electoral participation, the political sign concordance between the
local and the upper government level were tested.
Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi (2000) produced in turn an
interesting contribution focused in the impact of political and institutional
factors upon the fiscal outcome and behaviour of Argentine provinces. In
developing the arguments, the authors contended that the matter could be
regarded as a common pool game at two levels: within each province and
across political units; in this connection, the existence of a revenue sharing
system whereby taxes were centrally collected and later distributed to
provinces enabled an over spending bias across jurisdictions in so far as
each province tried to overuse the national common source of fiscal revenues.
Jones et al (2000) conducted an estimation of a pooled cross section of
23 jurisdictions, from 1985 through 1996, aimed at analyzing the
determinants of revenue and spending in the Argentine provinces; in
doing so they hypothesized the effect of political and institutional variables
stating that provinces receiving larger percentages of per capita transfers
(from the revenue sharing system) would have higher per capita expenditures,
that provinces sharing the same political sign than the central government
would be subject to a more stricter fiscal discipline10 (i.e. lower per capita
spending than otherwise) and that provincial per capita expenditures
would be higher in election years than in the rest of the period. It is worth
mentioning that the paper’s empirical conclusions somehow availed the
stated hypotheses since not only Jones et al could supply evidences of
the expansionary effect of inter governmental grants upon provincial
spending11 but showed too that party discipline (similar political signs)
played a significant role in checking the expansion of provincial spending.
Also electoral spending cycles were detected implying higher provincial
expenditure in election years as compared with other years.
Persson and Tabellini (2004) also investigated the effect of electoral
rules and forms of government upon fiscal policy; more precisely, they
contributed with an empirical paper whose objective was to analyze the
impact of electoral rules and government forms on the size and composition
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10. In this point, Jones et al adhered to Alt and Lowry’s prediction (1994) in their study of the
fiscal performance of US states, according to party affiliation.
11. Jones et al explained this feature as the result of decoupling tax and spending decisions.
of government spending; that is, to contrast fiscal outcomes under proportional
and majoritarian elections as well as with presidential and parliamentary
governments. The authors used information for 80 democracies12 for the
period 1990-98, although they also reported results in a subset of 60
democracies for which data were available for a longer period.
Results obtained led the authors to conclude that presidential
regimes induced a smaller government size (lower public spending) than
parliamentary democracies whereas majoritarian elections resulted in turn
in smaller governments and smaller welfare programs (social spending)
than in the cases of elections based on proportional representation regimes.
In an article very much related to the matter being studied in this
paper, Bercoff and Nougués (2005) analyzed also the incidence of determined
constitutional constraints upon the fiscal performance of governments; in
particular, they assessed the possible links between a set of institutional
variables and the provincial public spending in Argentine for the period
1991-2001.In highlighting the main findings of their empirical analysis,
the authors concluded that, while a strict budgetary design (i.e. legislatures
were not given the faculty of raising spending levels submitted by the
executive) stood as an efficacious mechanism to moderate expenditure
levels, governors’ possibility of reelection (contrariwise to what it would
have been expected) did not show any impact upon spending. Results were
statistically significant when the hypothesis of the similar political sign
was tested, as results fell in line with predictions by Jones et al (2000):
when governors and central government shared the same political sign,
provinces seemed to face more effectively spending reductions; the same
conclusion extended to the structure of legislatures deducing that bicameral
system successfully operated checks and balances. Finally, and in relation
to the impact of fiscal variables, Bercoff and Nougués found a strong negative
correlation between accountability and spending levels: the higher the
proportion of own resources the smaller the levels of per capita current
spending (and also the proportion between current spending and the gross
geographic product).
Fridrij (2006) in turn analyzed the response of the Argentine
provincial public spending to control and fiscal variables in the two
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12. For the definition of democratic governments, the authors resorted to Gastil Indexes of
political rights and civil liberties, varying from 1 to 7. They included countries not exceeding 5 in
the average of the two indexes in the period 1990-1998.
following periods: 1963-2001 and 1984-2001; the author also evaluated
the impact upon spending of diverse institutional restraints made effective
by constitutional amendments taking place in the periods mentioned.
Concerning budget and control variables, the empirical exercise permitted
Fridrij to assert that public spending positively reacted to a better economic
performance (increases in gross geographic product) and to provinces’
higher degree of economic opening whereas, on the other side, a growing
fiscal independence and population increases tended to reduce spending,
in the latter case as a result of scale economies.
With respect to institutional variables, Fridrij found firm econometric
evidence that, while governors’ possibility of reelection tended to increase
public spending13, bicameral legislatures and identical political sign for
provinces and the central government worked in the other direction and
favoured an expenditure reduction. Finally, the author pointed out the scarce
or null statistical relevance found with respect to institutional variables
standing for constitutional restraints, such as limits to debt and conditions
for the use of credit by governments.
The fiscal behaviour of both national and subnational governments,
followed by incumbents attempting to achieve their re-election, was also a
matter of extensive conceptual and empirical treatment; in this connection,
credits should be given to Downs’ seminal paper (1957) by which the idea
of a vote-maximizing model and the emergence of political business
cycles were introduced and extensively referred to later in the literature of
Public Choice. In putting forward the idea of a political market14 based
on the assumption that voters sought to maximize their utility and political
parties the number of votes15, Downs’ developments also enabled other
analytical extensions as for instance their use to explaining the possibility
of macroeconomic cycles caused by governments’ over expansion of
public expenditure when pursuing vote-maximization goals, as suggested
by diverse authors. Closely related to Downs’ model, Nordhaus (1975) in
turn modeled the manipulation of economic policy by incumbents in election
years aiming at showing how pre-election expansionary fiscal policies
could help politicians to get reelected.
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13. Let it be emphasized that this conclusion runs counter the evidence presented by Bercoff
and Nougués (2005) and econometric findings quoted in the present paper, when the response of
spending categories to the hypothesis was tested.
14. Similar in its functioning to an economic market where goods are traded.
15. As Brown and Jackson (1983) pointed out, the median voter was the key subject as its preferences
played a central role in the Downsian model of competition between political parties.
The matter deserved particular attention from Brender and Drazen
(2005) who focused their article in the existence of political business
cycles (deliberate economic activity increases in election years in order) as
well as of political budget cycles, resulting from election-year increases in
expenditures or tax cuts, in both cases stemming from incumbents’ endeavours
to improve their reelection prospects. Although many empirical studies
give evidence of political budget cycles (expansionary fiscal policies)
more often occurring in less developed countries, these authors revised
empirical evidence on the performance of expansionary fiscal policies at
the subnational level for countries like the United States, Colombia or
Israel (Peltzman, 1992, Brender, 2003 and Drazen and Slave, 2005) and
arrived at the surprising conclusion that voters might as well punish, rather
than reward, loose fiscal policies in election years, putting thus at stake
incumbents’ chances of being reelected. In an attempt to check by
themselves whether the hypotheses that increased deficits during an election
year, and loose fiscal policies during the term in office, helped reelection
could be econometrically proven, Brender and Drazen undertook an large
scale evaluation of a cross section of 74 countries for the period 1960-2003
and showed that expected results from opportunistic political budget
cycles were not supported by the empirical evidence, no matter the type of
country analyzed, and contrariwise, some evidence was found that loose
fiscal policies over the incumbent’s term of office were somehow associated
with a statistically significant lower probability of reelection.
The occurrence of Downsian-like behaviours and political budget
cycles was also analyzed by Meloni (2008) departing from the widespread
idea in the literature that incumbents following an opportunistic behaviour,
and seeking to enhance their chances of continuing in office, increase
public spending (or fiscal deficit) or change the expenditure mix16, either
in the pre-election period or in the election year. In this line of reasoning,
Meloni aimed at testing the existence of clientelistic and election public
budget cycles in Argentine provinces for what he resorted to a dynamic
panel data model including dependent fiscal policy variables such as per
capita total expenditures, salaries, provincial fiscal revenues and the ratios
of current to capital outlays and of current spending to direct investment;
the panel included the 24 provinces and extended from 1984 to 2004. For
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16. As Meloni stressed it, the change in the spending mix is aimed at favouring the so
called “visible” outlays, or politically oriented expenditures such as jobs and transfers rather
than infrastructure.
testing clientelistic-augmented and election political budget cycles in
Argentina, Meloni used dummy variables respectively taking value 1 for
the election year, the year before and two years before and 0 otherwise;
likewise, and for controlling for political influences he borrowed from
Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi (2000) the fiscal discipline variable
indicating that central and provincial governments shared the same political
sign and finally included the impact of socio economic variables such as
the rate of growth of per capita gross domestic product and unemployment
rates. Meloni’s main conclusions were that while per capita total expenditures
were high in election years, as well as one and two years before the
elections, no evidences were found of changes in election year expenditure
mix17; finally, and concerning governors’ efforts to enhance their reelection
prospects, evidences seemed to rule out manipulation of local taxes in
favour of the more direct current expenditure instrument.
III. STYLIZED FACTS OF PROVINCIAL PUBLIC FINANCES IN ARGENTNA
The performance of total, current and capital revenues and spending
of Argentine provincial governments during the period used for the
econometric estimations exhibits features deserving several comments, as
shown by tables and figures below. As can be seen, ratios in the tables and
their corresponding graphical representation account for three situations
that characterized the Argentine economy from 1993 through 2004; that is,
the convertibility regime18 (1993-2001), the exit of the convertibility, the
default of external debt and the devaluation of the national currency (2002)
and the beginning of the post default period (2003-2004).
According to the ratios shown in table 1, provincial total and
current revenues showed a fairly stable behaviour between 1993 and 2001,
only disturbed by a slight cyclical pattern well depicted by the graphs in
figure 1, whose peaks and troughs were respectively reached in 2000 and
1995. It is also worth emphasizing that the almost perfect correlation
between both mentioned ratios stems from the fact that current revenues
practically accounted for the 95% of total revenues, and the latter in turn
acknowledged an overwhelming and constant tax content. On the other
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17. Meloni speculated in this connection that clientele securing instruments such as transfers
and subsidies were preferred by incumbent governments in place of infrastructure spending.
18. Convertibility refers to the currency board scheme implemented as of 1991 and by which
the national currency (the peso) exchanged 1 by 1 with the U.S. dollar.
side, and despite its low significance, the ratio for capital revenues
showed amarked cyclical pattern to the extent that, in 1997, its value doubled
the period average.
As pointed out, the close correlation between total and current
revenues can also be viewed from another angle, by analyzing figures in
table 2; in this connection, the two first ratios indicate that tax revenues
account in average for about 85% of current revenues for what—and
relating with figures in table 1—ratios reassert that total provincial revenues
practically rest on funds both from own and shared tax revenues19.
Revenues’ constancy in percent of gross domestic product, as
shown from 1993 through 2001, was endangered mainly by the important
product’ loss caused by the exit of convertibility and the devaluation of the
national currency and this was in turn reflected in the tax revenue/current
revenue ratio’s minimum value for 2002. Let it be noticed that this feature,
in addition to the dwindled value of the current revenue/gdp ratio for the
same year, curiously acknowledged an anticyclical behaviour of provincial
taxation in Argentina, which also persisted in 2003-2004 when the
Argentine product began again to grow.
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19. This feature will be resorted upon later, in Section IV, in relation to the use of the degree
of financial autonomy as an explanatory variable.
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Figure 1
Argentina, Provincial Revenues
(in percent of gross domestic product)
Figure 2
Argentina, Provincial Fiscal Revenue Ratios
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The empirical evidence also shows that all categories of provincial
public spending exhibited a remarkable stability during the convertibility
–in percent of gross domestic product– at least until 1997. As is easily
noticed, figures in the ensuing table 3 avail this assertion as total, current and
capital expenditure averaged 11.3%, 9.6% and 1.7% respectively.
However, total and current public expenditure experienced a mar-
ked rise during the last four years of convertibility, as their share of gross
domestic product climbed to average values of 12.7% and 11.2%, respectively,
from 1998 through 2001. Such a pattern seems to coincide with the time in
which provinces, unable to satisfy their budgetary needs with dwindled
shared revenues20 or with their own tax resources, resorted massively to
debt in order to somehow meet the principle of fiscal sufficiency.
The fall of provincial total and current public spending in 2002-2003
was a direct consequence of the post convertibility crisis (default and
devaluation) in which the gross domestic product underwent a loss of
more than 15%21; with relation to capital expenditure, the fall began
earlier (in 1999) and responded rather to crowding out effects caused by
current public spending feeding on debt than to the impact of the economic
crisis of 2001-2002.
Finally, the economic recovery taking place as of 2002 and the
declared policy goals of the new government that took office in 2003, in
the sense that public investment and public and social services should
reach higher levels, explain the catching up experimented by provincial
public spending in 2004-200622. However, it is important to point out that
provinces acceded to increased national funds through transfers rather than
through the revenue sharing system, as it could have been expected23,
providing thus support to the assertion that actual fiscal federalism suffered a
setback compared to preceding decades; figures in table 2 are in this case
worth mentioning as they show that while current transfers amounted to
2.51% of total provincial current revenues in 1993, they climbed to almost
7% in 2004.
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20. One of reasons explaining the fall in share revenues accruing to provinces was the economic
recession affecting the country since 1998 and lasting until 2002.
21. The exact figures were 4.4% in 2001 and 10.9% in 2002.
22. Not shown in tables and figures.
23. As mentioned above, not only that new revenue sharing system has not been enacted yet
but also the transfer of national funds still takes place on an increasingly discretionary basis.
Ratios in table 3 and their representation in figure 3 bring about
another interesting possibility of analysis in so far as spending can also be
assessed in the light of the Downsian vote-maximizing model and the
political budget cycle above quoted when analyzing Brender and Drazen
(2005) and Meloni’s contributions (2008).
By carefully examining plots in figure 3, a preliminary conclusion
would be that a Downsian-like behaviour by provincial governments could
not be ruled out at once. Let it be pointed out, in the first place, that provinces
have had three elections throughout the period considered (1995, 1999 and
2003) and in each one most of governors ran for reelection. Given that, in
the first two cases (1995 and 1999), total and current public expenditure
peaked in the year of election while they dwindled (in percent of gross
domestic product) the year immediately after the election, an econometric
test seems to be required in order to assess whether the hypothesis of a
political business cycle’s occurrence can be statistically proven. Figures
for 2003 appear to be contradicting what one would expect although the
situation was in that case more complex, as the country began to leave
behind the 2001-2002 crisis and benefited from an economic recovery
while, at the same time, the newly elected government made it clear its
objective of gaining a higher state participation in determined fields such
as public investment and social expenditure.
It is also clear that capital spending had a more stable pattern
during the period and not always accompanied current spending swings,
what is in fact reasserting that the latter’s greater suitability for political
aims and uses can not be paralleled by the former’s at least on one account:
the longer period required for a public investment to be available for
voters’ use or enjoyment.
Another of the article’s objectives was to find out whether a
major participation of own taxes enhanced provinces’s accountability
and differently affected public spending categories; in line with it, table 2
summarizes the evolution of the following three ratios in the period
considered: provincial own tax revenues/total current revenues, provincial
and funds from the revenue sharing system/total current revenues and current
transfers/total current revenues, whose performance deserve analysis.
Despite some apparent stability in the first ratio, provinces’
performance in raising their own taxes clearly impaired as the average fell
from 35.61% in 1993-1999 to 33.50% in 2000-2004. Reasons explaining
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Figure 3
Argentina, Provincial Public Spending
(in percent of gross domestic product)
Figure 4
Argentina, Provincial Financial Debt Stock
in billions of current pesos
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the loss of 6% in share include a certain sluggishness or lack of effectiveness in
provincial tax administrations as well as provinces’ weak commitment
to furthering their tax bases. Similarly, although in a smaller proportion,
consolidated fiscal resources (provincial and revenue sharing funds)
worsened in the period from 87.97% of current incomes in 1993-1999 to
83.79% in 2000-2004, mainly owing to the Congress delay in enacting the
new revenue sharing system; this in turn placed in the central government’s
hands the important instrument of non automatic discretionary transfers,
which more than doubled their participation in provincial budgets (see
table 2 and figure 2) and for whose perception provincial governments
permanently strive.
Table 4 and figures 4 and 5 offer interesting insights related to one
of explanatory variables to be included in the model of the ensuing Section
IV. As illustrated below, during 1997-2001 provinces steadily resorted to
debt in order to make up the gap between a rising current public spending24
and current revenues. Explanations for that need to be sought in the
sluggish performance of tax revenues due to a slower gross geographic
product’s growth path but mainly in the notorious lack of fiscal discipline
prevailing in provinces during the last years of convertibility (1999-2001)
which resulted in that current public spending’s participation in product
rose more than two percent points, as shown by table 3 and figure 3.
The situation turned dramatic in 2002-2003 when most of provincial
governments had to massively resort to issuing quasi money (public
bonds) compulsory used to pay civil servants’ wages; the growing burden
of provincial debt in these years is illustrated by the debt stock ratio in
table 4 and also well depicted by the plots in figures 425 and 5.
As it happened in preceding economic crises, provinces’ common
practice of issuing public bonds that were compulsory placed among their
civil servants through the mechanism of wage payments had important and
unwanted consequences. People immediately channeled bonds into the
market, via purchases of goods and services and the quasi moneys’ cycle
only ended when the central government intervened to bail out provincial
governments undergoing serious financial strains.
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24. See figure 3.
25. The plot in figure 4 shows that the nominal debt stock increased almost 230% in 2002. As
the inflation for that year reached 39.6% (due to the exit of convertibility and the domestic currency
devaluation), the debt stock still experienced on increase of almost 190% with respect to 2001.
The incidence of provincial financial debt stocks tended however to
recede as of 2003 mainly due to the recovery of the national economy, which
naturally diminished the burden of public debt upon provincial treasuries, but
also following the mentioned generalized bail out by the central government
whose main objective was to restore monetary order by doing away with all
the quasi money instruments created by provincial governments.
Figure 5
Argentina, Provincial Financial Debt Stock
IV. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE PANEL DATA MODEL
In analyzing the performance of provincial public spending in
Argentina the idea is put forward that variables of economic, fiscal and
institutional nature not only affect the level of public spending but also,
and mainly, its composition. Thus, in addition to the traditional macroecono-
mic theory suggesting that expenditures relate directly with the level and
growth path of product, in so far as gross increases in domestic product avail
provinces to accede to more shared funds whereas gross geographic product
directly impact on their own fiscal revenues26, it might well happen that the
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26. Curiously enough, econometric estimations showed that the impact of product upon
spending fell short of confirming the expected results.
relationship could be more ambiguous if spending categories (in percent of
total spending) were used in place of expenditure in levels.
Nevertheless, a more interesting approach to the analysis of
subnational public spending comes from the normative theory of fiscal
federalism and federal finances27 in so far it stresses that governments’
spending performance in supplying public goods at the required amounts
and quality levels is seen to be closely related to the amount of fiscal
revenues upon which the jurisdiction exercises direct control; that is, its
degree of financial autonomy. In other words, the higher the percent of tax
revenues collected28 by the provinces the more accountable their governments
are expected to be towards taxpayers. Contrariwise, the more provincial
governments rely on revenues and transfers29 from upper jurisdictions the
more diffuse its accountability degree becomes. The just described normative
standpoint is here used to empirically show that the degree of financial
autonomy, via an immediate impact upon governments’ accountability,
directly affects different spending categories’ share of total spending.
Following the same argumentative line the principle of financial
sufficiency, that is, the fact that provincial governments meet all their
spending commitments without the need to resort to borrowing in order to
restore the budget constraint30, has also been seen to influence not only the
amount but also the composition of public spending. The inclusion of this
explanatory variable, as well as of debt stocks, amounts therefore to reflect
in the econometric model the hypothesis that determined spending categories’
participation in total spending respectively decrease/increase with the
former and increase/decrease with the latter variable.
A new approach which, apart from economic and fiscal variables
also considers politico-institutional features of fiscal federalism31, has
recently gathered the attention of economists involved with the analysis of
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27. See for instance Bird (1986, 1994,1996).
28. Needless to say, tax collection by the province also implies the faculties to tax and
to define tax bases, tax payers and tax rates.
29. An interesting case emerges when analyzing transfers of shared revenues in countries like
Argentina, in which provinces expressly delegate taxes and tax collection (i.e. VAT, Income Tax)
to the central government but whose yield is yet legally considered as provinces´ own.
30. The principle of financial sufficiency must mainly be considered with relation to current
expenitures as the important intergenerational impacts of public investment turn reasonable to
resort to debt for financing capital outlays.
31. See Section II above.
subnational spending. In particular the approach, which somehow updates
the interest for the Downsian developments of the political business and
budget cycles, places the focus on provinces’ constitutional and legal
arrangements concerning matters such as bicameral legislatures,
governors’ possibility of reelection, constitutional or legal limits to
public spending or to provincial public borrowing and also conditions for
use of credit. This line of study also considers the impact of central level-
provinces political alignment and the effect of voting and electoral rules32
upon subnational fiscal discipline and spending.
Based on the ideas sketched in the preceding paragraphs, the basic
analytic framework of the estimated panel data model consists of a regression
equation with the form indicated by the following expression:
yit = αi + B´ xit + eit
In which vector y embodies the dependent variables for the 23
provinces and the city of Buenos Aires and vector x the K used regressors
or explanatory variables; as usual, e stands for the random error term.
The following series, showing different public spending categories
in percent of total provincial public spending, were in turn provincially
computed and stand for the panel data model’s dependent variables:
• CUPS_TSP: Current spending in percent of total public spending.
• COPS_TSP: Consumption spending in percent of total public
spending.
• SOPS_TSP: Social spending in percent of total public spending.
• ECPS_TSP: Economic spending in percent of total public spending.
• CAPS_TSP: Capital spending in percent of total public spending.
whereas the explanatory variables, accounting for economic,
fiscal and borrowing performance, are represented by:
• GGP: Per capita gross geographic product of provinces. There
exists ambiguity about the coefficient’s sign given that spending catego-
ries are expected to differently react to this variable’s level33.
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32. See Persson and Tabellini (2004).
33. Reasons for that are given in the next Section, when econometric estimations are analyzed.
(1)
• RESPOND: The variable’s value obtains from the quotient
between provincial tax revenues and provincial current revenues. The ratio
measures each province’s degree of financial autonomy, as a proxy for the
accountability level and the coefficient’s sign is expected to be negative in
the case of current, consumption and social spending and positive for
economic and capital spending.
• RESPOND1: It also stands for provinces’ degree of financial
autonomy and differs from the preceding one in that the numerator also
includes provincial tax revenues and funds from the revenue sharing
regime accruing to each province. As with RESPOND, negative coefficient’s
signs are expected in the case of current, consumption and social spending
and positive ones for economic and capital spending.
• SUFIN: It measures provinces’ degree of financial sufficiency
on the basis of the quotient between current revenues and current spending.
The coefficient’s sign is expected to be positive in the case of current,
consumption and social spending as, letting aside efficiency considerations,
higher degrees of financial sufficiency somehow enhances governments’
possibilities of incurring in the mentioned expenditure categories.
• PD: Per capita provincial stock of public debt. A positive
coefficient’s sign is expected for current spending34 and a negative
one in the rest of cases.
The following categorical variables are also included with the
object of inferring whether provinces’ constitutional arrangements and
institutional performance somehow affect the various categories of provincial
public spending:
• D1: province’s political sign: it takes value 1 when provincial
and national ruling political parties coincide (or share a coalition) and
value 0 in the opposite case35. In line with the idea that central governments are
in a position of encouraging fiscal discipline in provinces sharing the same
political sign, current, consumption and social spending variables’
coefficients should in this case be negative.
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34. PD´s positive coefficient in this case reflects the mentioned practice of Argentine provin-
cial governments consisting in resorting to debt for wage payments any time the economic cycle
reduced tax revenues, or when fiscal resources fell short of needed, due to the incorporation of
temporary personnel on a permanent basis.
35. This variable was used by J. Bercoff and J. Nougués (2005, op. cit) and taken in turn from
M. Jones et al (2000).
• D2: it stands for the case in which governors exercise the right to
be reelected: it takes value 1 in the last year of the governor’s term (the
fourth) and value 0 in the rest. Should the Downsian hypothesis of the
political business cycle hold, current, consumption and social spending
variables’ coefficients will be positive.
• D3: it stands for the case in which governors exercise the right to
be reelected: it takes value 1 in the last two years of the governor’s term
(the third and the fourth) and value 0 in the rest. As in the previous case,
positive coefficient’s signs are expected for current, consumption and
social spending variables.
•D4: Reelection right exercised: it takes value 1 in the first year of
the new term and value 0 in the rest. Following the hypothesis that
governments, once reelected, aim at regaining fiscal discipline, negative
variables’ coefficient signs are expected for current, consumption and
social public spending.
Other possibilities of ascertaining the impact of constitutional
arrangements upon provincial public spending, by using dummy variables,
were also suggested and used by Fridrij (2006), from whom the following
ones were borrowed:
• D5: provincial debt: it takes value 1 when constitutional limits
exist and 0 when they do not exist. Effectiveness of limits should be
reflected in negative coefficients for current, consumption and social
spending variables and positive ones in the case of economic and capital
public spending.
• D6: limits in the use of credit: it takes value 1 if limits exist and
0 otherwise. As above, negative coefficients are expected for current,
consumption and social spending and positive ones otherwise.
• D7: provincial public spending: it takes value 1 when constitutional
limits exist and 0 when they do not exist. Variables’ coefficient signs are
expected to behave as in D5 above.
• D8: limits on public spending: it takes value 1 if limits do not
exist and 0 otherwise. Needless to emphasize, absence of limits should
result mainly in positive coefficients for current and consumption public
spending and, to some extent, for social spending.
Finally, and in line with the widespread idea found in the literature
(Tsebelis, 1995; Bercoff and Nougués, 2005) that a bicameral system
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introduces check and balance mechanisms in the functioning of both
chambers, the ensuing dummy variable is also considered in the econometric
analysis:
• D9: Bicamerality: it assumes value 1 in provinces with two
chambers and 0 in single-chamber’s provinces. Following the thread of
arguments, check and balances will more likely impose discipline on
current and consumption spending, for what these variables’ coefficients
should bear negative signs.
V. ANALYSIS OF ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
The empirical assessment of the impact of economic, fiscal and
politico-institutional variables upon diverse categories of provincial public
spending was carried out by resorting to a panel data model, as it permitted
to analyze the 24 Argentine provinces’ spending performance (cross
section units) during the period 1993-2004 (time series analysis).
The series for the dependent and explanatory variables used in the
estimation were built on the basis of data obtained from the National
Direction of Coordination with Provinces (www.mecon.gov.ar/hacienda),
available under the following headings:
Geographic Gross Product
Total Provincial Public Spending
Current Public Spending
Consumption Public Spending
Capital Public Spending
Social and Welfare Public Spending
Economic Public Spending
Provincial Stock of Public Debt
Total Revenues
Total Tax Revenues
Provincial Tax Revenues (levied within the jurisdiction)
National Tax Revenues (from the Revenue Sharing Regime)
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Series for the Geographic Gross Product of provinces were built
from information provided by Provincial Statistical Offices, the National
Institute of Statistics and Censuses and the National Direction of Regional
Economic Programming. The information mentioned above (including
geographic gross product) was obtained or computed for each of the 24
Argentine provinces and converted into per capita pesos of 2004.
The usual two alternatives were in turn resorted to in relation to
the individual effect represented by a in equation (1): one consisting in
considering the term constant all throughout the period, but specific for
each unit or province (fixed effects) and another one in which the same a
applies to all provinces (pooled regression)36. As known, in the fixed
effect model, with specific a for each province, differences between units
are captured by the differences in the constant term and interpreted as a
parametric displacement of the regression function.
In choosing between the two alternatives37, the decision for the
fixed effects variant, instead of a single constant term for all provinces
(pooled estimation), was based on results for ratio F which precisely
determines group effect’s significance by contrasting the null hypothesis
that all a are similar38.
Although the fixed effect approach includes the case in which the
regressors have different slopes for each of the cross section units, it was
here taken that the coefficients of slopes were the same for all 24 jurisdictions.
The econometric program used was Stata, that computes constant terms
and regressors with a least square dummy variable (LSDV) model in
which expression (1) becomes:
yi = iαi + Xi β + εi
where i stands now for the matrix of dummy variables of order i x i.
Problems of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation turned up once
the model was run as tests confirmed that the variance of errors was not
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36. Greene (2000) pointed out that, even in this case, ordinary least squares still rendered consistent
and efficient estimates of the common α as well as of regression coefficients.
37. In discarding the use of a random effect model (or error component model) it is recalled here
that this approach assumes that cross section units represent a random sample taken from a
larger population whereas, in this case, all the 24 provinces were included (that is, the total
population).
38. Greene (2000) pointed out that, under the null hypothesis, the efficient estimate coincided
with pooled least squares.
(2)
constant for all cross section units and that errors were serially correlated.
As it is known, heteroskedasticity may respond to a set of causes, the most
common being an erroneous functional formulation of equations, asymmetries
in the distribution of model’s regressors or atypical factors; nevertheless,
the point must be borne in mind that this problem is fairly common when
dealing with cross section information in which the units (in this case the
provinces) markedly differ in size.
The literature stresses that in both the problems mentioned
linearly unbiased, consistent and asymptotically distributed coefficients
can still be obtained with ordinary least square estimation methods; however,
and in reason of theirs not exhibiting minima variances, estimations will
not yield efficient estimators or BLUE and larger confidence intervals
will be called for and that makes t and F values imprecise.
The lack of satisfaction with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in
random errors led to the possibility of jointly tackling both problems (once
identified) by resorting to Feasible Generalized Least Squares, run in stata
with the command xtgls39. For checking the correction, the Modified
Wald40 Test for groupwise heteroskedasticity and the Wooldridge41 Test
for autocorrelation in panel data were implemented within Stata with the
commands xttest3 and xtserial, respectively, operating after the fixed
effect panel data model was estimated.
The econometric estimation of equation (2) above, using a fixed
effect panel data model, yielded statistically significant and not significant
results for the variables defined in the preceding Section. In this connection,
some of the main results concerning the effect of the used variables upon
the performance of categories of provincial public spending are summarized
in the ensuing tables and will be used to draw important preliminary
conclusions.
According Table 5, showing results for Current Spending’s share
of Total Provincial Public Spending as the dependent variable, only three
estimated coefficients exhibit the expected sign and proved to be statistically
significant; that is, these corresponding to the provinces’ degree of
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39. As this command does not automatically compute fixed effects, dummy variables were
introduced with xi.
40. In spite that tests checking for heteroskedasticity strongly rest on the assumption of
normality of errors, Greene (2000) stressed that the Modified Wald Test would work even though
the assumption did not hold.
41. See Wooldridge (2002).
financial autonomy (RESPOND1)42 and the stock of public debt (DP)43
and the one for the categorical variable D5, standing for constitutional
limits on provincial public debt44.
The statistical significance of RESPOND1 falls in line with the
upheld hypothesis that higher financial autonomy will lead to current
spending’s lesser weight in total expenditures. Another form of explaining
this result is that the greater the proportion of fiscal resources accruing
from within the jurisdiction the more accountable governments will be
when meeting people’s real demand for public goods, the latter not being
necessary related to increases in current or consumption expenditure45.
The significance and sign of PD reveals in turn another feature of
the Argentine provincial public spending, already highlighted when defi-
ning the variable. The provincial performance clearly shows that, either
being an usual recourse to credit or a compulsory placed debt46, the result
in general is an increase of current spending owing to the major financial
burden (interest payments) as much as for the use given to funds captured
by governments. There is also a close connection with the result for D5, in
so far as it is indicating that current spending’s participation tends to decrease
when limits exist to the use of public credit.
The point deserves been mentioned that, save for the case of D547
(constitutional limits to debt o limits to the use of public credit), econometric
estimations of constitutional and politico-institutional variables’ coefficient
showed in the rest of cases to be not significantly different from 0. Thus,
95ECONOMIC AND POLITICO- INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES...
42. It needs to be stressed that whenever RESPOND1 resulted statistically significant and
held the expected sign, RESPOND also did it. Therefore, the decision to use the former variable in
order to represent financial autonomy aimed at emphasizing the point that shared fiscal revenues
should also be considered a part of provinces’ own fiscal resources.
43. Comments to the preliminary version suggested to use the lagged value of public debt
stock as the explanatory variable, instead of the contemporaneous one, as usually found in the
literature. Econometric estimations using PD(1) also resulted significantly different from 0 but
they did not show an overwhelming superiority with regards to PD, which can be explained by the
already mentioned feature of provincial governments issuing debt to defray current expenses.
44. Results are always similar if D7 (limits on the use of credit) is used instead of D5.
45. Although the conclusion may appear somehow misleading as the current component of
public goods is by no means minor (for instance in health or education), people in general considered
excessive or disproportionate current spending’s participation in total expenditure, specially when
compared with capital outlays’ share of spending. Likewise, there is a widespread believe among
population that increases in current spending, beyond certain limits are of no use as they only
serve governments´ political or electoral objectives.
46. In general, apart from the fact that debt funds are often used to defray current spending,
many a provincial government customarily issued debt compulsory placed among civil servants,
as was already explained mentioned in the analysis of stylized facts.
47. In all cases, the value, sign and statistical significance of D5 and D6 coincided for what it
was clear that both measure the same thing.
neither Jones’ hypothesis (2000), mentioned by Bercoff and Nougués
(2005), that central governments’ efforts to induce spending reductions in
the subnational level held more chances of getting through when government
levels shared the same political sign (D1) nor Fridrij’s assertion (2006) of
rising expenditures (political spending?48) in the last year of governors’
term49 (D2) were endorsed by the econometric estimations50 showing the
performance of the expenditure mix.
Table 5*
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
Coefficients: generalized least squares
Panels: heteroskedastic
Correlation: common AR(1) coefficient for all panels (0.2462)
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CPS_TPS COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR Z P>Z
RESPOND1 -.3033546 .0690631 -4.39 0.000
PD .1550476 .0405192 3.83 0.000
D5 -.0883199 .0338654 -2.61 0.009
I2 .0316938 .0409644 0.77 0.439
I3 -.0612838 .0221241 -2.77 0.006
I4 -.2443454 .0330849 -7.39 0.000
I5 .0626454 .0206802 3.03 0.002
I6 -.0055662 .0182640 -0.30 0.761
I7 .0447182 .0404830 1.10 0.269
I8 -.0382517 .0228341 -1.68 0.094
I9 -.0660853 .0319994 -2.07 0.039
I10 -.0596514 .0235956 -2.53 0.011
I11 -.1796949 .0264132 -6.80 0.000
I12 -.1075751 .0306639 -3.51 0.000
I13 -.0746627 .0295836 -2.52 0.012
I14 -.1201099 .0246233 -4.88 0.000
I15 -.2226591 .0364351 -6.11 0.000
I16 -.0744308 .0224758 -3.31 0.001
I17 -.0662514 .0235399 -2.81 0.005
I18 -.0692306 .0215021 -3.22 0.001
I19 -.2578547 .0272491 -9.46 0.000
I20 -.2710835 .0455518 -5.95 0.000
I21 .0908449 .0400466 2.27 0.023
I22 -.0546922 .0202652 -2.70 0.007
I23 -.1612768 .0356414 -4.52 0.000
I24 -.0638533 .0226803 -2.82 0.005
CONS. 1.1119570 .0528507 21.04 0.000
*. For limitation of space complete sets of information for fixed effects will not be
provided for the rest of estimations. However, these can be obtained from the author on
request (ernerezk@eco.unc.edu.ar).
It is finally worth mentioning that, contrariwise to what has been
asserted in other articles dealing with the subject (i.e. Bercoff and
Nougués, 2005), the variable D9 standing for bicamerality yielded neither
in this case nor in the rest of estimations results significantly different
from 0, for what the assumption of check and balances played by double
chambers could not be verified with the estimation of the panel data
econometric model51.
Although most of results in Table 6, that shows the impact of
different variables upon provincial consumption spending’s share of total
public spending, do not run counter those already mentioned in Table 5,
some apparent contradictions deserve being considered as is the case of a
negative coefficient for public debt. The explanation needs to be sought at
the different items embodied by both spending categories with salaries of
permanent labour bearing an overwhelming weight within current
expenditure, while consumption public spending includes only personnel
contracted on a temporary basis.
Table 6 also shows the striking result that –conversely to what one
might expect- an increase in gross geographic product induces a reduction
in consumption spending’s share. Notwithstanding the fact that this feature
would deserve a deeper analysis, it might tentatively be argued that, on the
one side, product increases could be reducing the need for certain public
goods52 to be supplied and, on the other, that product could be rather
indirectly affecting spending via budgetary and fiscal variables such fiscal
effort and financial sufficiency as both are expected to increase following a
raise in product. SUFIN’s coefficient sign and statistically significance may
somehow being providing support to the preceding hypothesis.
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48. Certain budgetary categories of current spending, as for instance’ goods and non personal
services’, are often used to channel expenditures whose reasonability and urgency is debatable, to
say the least, as they respond to what is customarily considered political spending.
49. It is worth quoting , in this connection, that Bercoff and Nougués’ (2005) also found
estimations not significantly different from 0 and bearing negative signs; they explained the
results saying that governors able to be reelected had more fiscal discipline in order not to endanger
their next term´ fiscal sustainability.
50. A positive and significant coefficient for D2 would have hinted a Downsian behaviour at
the subnational level.
51. In the light of results, one may be led to test the opposite assumption; that is, whether the
political trade off between both chambers will not cause certain expenditure categories to increa-
se their participation.
52. An example of this is some parents’ attitude to replace public for private schooling once
economic conditions make this possible.
Estimations for categorical variables yielded in change mixed
results; whereas coefficients and signs for D5 and D7 clearly indicate that
consumption public spending share will fall should limits exist to public
debt and public spending and to the use of credit, D1’s coefficient sign
does not confirm the hypothesis stating that the central government has the
power and will to fiscally discipline provincial governments sharing the
same political space. As before, no statistically clear evidences were found
of a relationship between a Downsian-like behaviour and this consumption
spending category.
Table 6
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
Coefficients: generalized least squares
Panels: heteroskedastic
Correlation: common AR(1) coefficient for all panels (0.3082)
Estimations in the ensuing Table 7, showing the impact of explanatory
variables upon social public expenditures’ participation in total spending,
permit once more to verify that difficulties are soon encountered when
trying to identify a single behavioural pattern of subnational public spending.
On the one hand, while coefficients and signs for financial autonomy,
stock of public debt and limits on provincial debt (use of credit) and public
spending fall in line with theoretical predictions, the sign of D8’s coefficient
is difficult to explain, to say the least.
98 ERNESTO REZK
COPS_TPS Coefficient Standard Error z P>z
RESPOND1 -.01146 .0023907 -4.80 0.000
PD -.005661 .0010699 -5.29 0.000
GGP -.00032 .0000868 -3.69 0.000
SUFIN .00129 .0002839 4.31 0.000
D1 .0007123 .00033 2.16 0.031
D5 -.0020615 .0004431 -4.65 0.000
D7 -.0063895 .0027256 -2.34 0.019
CONS .0422443 .002892 14.61 0.000
In spite of apparent similarities with results for current spending,
results in table 7 present another worth emphasizing subtlety. Let it be
noticed that gross geographic product has a negative though statistically
significant coefficient which indicates that the higher the product (as a
proxy to welfare) the smaller the amount jurisdictions devote to social
spending needed to assist the poor53. On the other hand, the fact that public
debt’s coefficient is here significant and negative falls in line with the
already mentioned argument that governments mostly resorted to credit
markets (or issued compulsory debt) to make up financial needs linked to
current, administrative or consumption expenditure.
Thus, whereas signs for RESPOND, PD, D5 and D7 reaffirm the
theoretical idea that higher accountability somehow displaces fiscal
resources from spending items in which salaries and other current spending
prevail, and the same is expected to happen when limits on spending or use
of credit exist, no straightaway explanation exists for GGP and D8’s
negative coefficients. It may however be hypothesized that the need for
additional social and welfare expenditures decreases as product grows, this
being particularly observable in the case of health spending and population’s
lesser pressure on public hospitals54 during economic expansions;
nevertheless, there is no a simple explanation for D8’s negative sign as not
constitutionally or legally set limits on public spending should produce the
opposite result, that is, to bring about higher percent participation of
expenditures traditionally viewed as governments’ political instruments55.
A rather intriguing feature of results is that by being most of
categorical variables, except for the three above mentioned, not statistically
different from 0, situations of political business cycles were ruled out
while the check and balance mechanisms of bicamerality could not be
proven in relation to social expenditure participation in total spending.
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53. One might also think of an inverse ultrarationality sequence; that is, as gross geographic
product expands people substitute some public goods (i.e. education, health) for private goods.
54. As declared labour has in Argentina the right to receive health services from private clinics
and hospitals, an employment rise via increases in product normally means less pressure on public
hospitals.
55. It goes without saying that, let aside education and health, people normally regarded
social spending as “asistencialista” expenditure delivered not in function of needs but of political
or electoral convenience.
Table 7
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
Coefficients: generalized least squares
Panels: heteroskedastic
Correlation: common AR(1) coefficient for all panels (0.1815)
Inspection of figures summarized in Table 8 (capital outlays as a
percent of provincial public spending is now the dependent variable),
brings to surface four features clearly highlighting provincial governments’
performance with regards to this spending category. First, the not found
relationship between product and capital formation; second, the hardly
noticed incidence of constitutional and politico-institutional variables upon
public capital spending (except in two cases); third, the statistical relevance
and positive sign of fiscal effort (RESPOND1), that implies that capital
spending proportionally increases as provincial financial autonomy rises
and fourth, the statistical significance and negative sign of public debt
stock indicating that provinces do not use debt funds for capital formation.
Not surprisingly, the lack of correlation between product and
public capital formation had already been noticed by Kamps (2005) in a
study for 22 OECD countries but in the context of the relationship between
private and public capital, the results of which led him to suggest that both
were close substitutes and crowded out each other, at least in the short run.
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COPS_TPS Coefficient Standard Error z P>z
RESPOND1 -.2834027 .1047305 -2.71 0.007
PD -.1375181 .0220596 -6.23 0.000
GGP -.0024277 .0013279 -1.83 0.068
D5 -.0815088 .0233632 -3.49 0.000
D7 -.0539077 .0276752 -1.95 0.051
D8 -.0665130 .0238131 -2.79 0.005
CONS .7086145 .0518106 13.68 0.000
It should by no means be strange that some politico-institutional
variables, such as D2 and D3 did not result statistically significant: in
reason of their complexities, long construction periods and resources
required, capital outlays do not properly fit political needs of governments
intending reelection in the same quick way as current spending does. Two
remarkable exceptions, in relation to categorical variables, were however
the coefficient of D5 whose positive sign and significance implies that
limits placed on the amount and use of credit works in the direction of
correctly favouring capital formation, contrariwise to what was shown for
current spending (see table 5).
The sign and statistically relevance of provinces’ financial
autonomy (RESPOND1) brings here out a result of undeniable policy
content: the more provinces cover their expenses with own fiscal resources
the higher the participation of capital outlays in terms of total provincial
spending. Another interpretation can be that greater financial autonomy in
turn enhances provincial governments’ accountability as they tend to devote
resources to spending categories of greater visibility and others than
current and consumption expenditures.
In pointing out next that public debt (PD), apart from being
statistically significant also has a negative coefficient, it must be recalled
the mentioned performance of this variable in the Argentine subnational
level, in which the recourse to compulsory debt usually responded to provincial
governments’ need of resources mainly to face civil servants’ payroll.
Although not statistically significant, D8’s positive coefficient
somehow shows that limits on public spending, apart from curtailing
current expenditure, may also induce capital outlays’ larger participation
in total spending.
In sum, robust results rendered by estimations in table 8 support
the advanced arguments that financial autonomy (based on own taxes and
shared revenues) in fact encourage capital outlays whereas debt resources do
not as the latter seldom go to capital formation. The impact of gross geographic
product upon this spending category, if any, is negative for the above suggested
short run crowding out between public and private investment.
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Table 856
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
Coefficients: generalized least squares
Panels: heteroskedastic
Correlation: common AR(1) coefficient for all panels (0.2323)
Figures summarized in Table 9 account also for a very interesting
case as variable ECPS_TSP embodies not only capital outlays but also
current public spending oriented towards all economic sectors in provinces.
As may be seen, the percent of economic public spending in total public
spending dwindles following enhanced financial sufficiency and increases
when constraints exist; far from being contradicting, results show –as
predicted- that financial sufficiency deters the current component of
economic expenditures from expanding and yet limits on debt and credit
use expand in turn the capital component. For reasons given above, the
public debt stock will shrink economic spending share of total spending57.
The fact that financial autonomy does not play any role, as did in previous
estimations, may be interpreted in the sense that accountability is better
represented here by the variable SUFIN as, by standing for the ratio between
current revenues and spending, is somehow implying that the fiscal effort
needed for financial sufficiency is not used in defraying the current component
of this spending category.
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COPS_TPS Coefficient Standard Error z P>z
RESPOND1 .2880 .0690419 4.17 0.000
PD -.1558058 .040493 -3.85 0.000
D5 .0949329 .0282493 3.36 0.001
D7 -.0527281 .028794 -1.83 0.067
D8 .0063849 .0282715 0.23 0.821
CONS -.1007452 .0528166 -1.91 0.056
56. Fixed effect for i7 dropped due to collinearity.
57. The sign in this case should not cause surprise as it depicts the several mentioned feature
of provincial public debt, whose end is not capital outlays but current expenditure.
Table 9
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
Coefficients: generalized least squares
Panels: heteroskedastic
Correlation: common AR(1) coefficient for all panels (0.2096)
The ensuing Table 10, summarizing results of all estimations,
helps visualizing signs of statistically different from 0 coefficients and,
therefore, how explanatory variables actually impact upon different spending
categories’ participation in total provincial public spending:
Table 10
Signs of statistically significant estimated coefficients
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ECPS_TSP Coefficient Standard Error z P>z
SUFIN -.0138 .0045647 -3.04 0.002
PD -.1162831 .0282295 -4.12 0.000
D5 .0635178 .0270747 2.35 0.019
CONS .0839013 .008405 9.98 0.000
VARIABLES
RES-
POND 1
SUFIN PD GGP D1 D5 D7 D8
CPS_TPS c + -
COPS_TPS - + - - + - -
SOPS_TPS - - - - - -
CAPS_TPS + - + -
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The research carried out permits to obtain conclusions which
helps to understand the performance of provincial public spending’s
categories in Argentina; particularly, how the latter react to economic,
fiscal and categorical variables. Results can be extended to other federal
countries undergoing a marked spending decentralization and also to
unitary-like countries in which locally elected authorities are able to affect
the spending composition.
The empirical analysis for the period 1993-2004, for which a fixed
effect panel data model was resorted to, departed from a theoretical
framework founded on the fundamentals of fiscal federalism and federal
finances, in turn enriched with the consideration of the impact of
politico-institutional variables upon diverse spending categories. Coefficients’
estimation enabled to arrive at the following preliminary conclusions:
• The hypothesis of the relationship between financial autonomy
and accountability resulted widely proven in respect of all
spending categories as tax revenues’ larger share within
current revenues (major own fiscal effort) was seen to dwindle
current, consumption and social public spending in percent
of total spending and to increase in change capital outlays’
participation; that is, the more provinces’ fiscal effort deepened
the more visible provinces’ use of resources (accountability
enhancement) seemed to become.
• In reinforcing the above mentioned results, major fiscal effort
by provinces led to an increased participation of capital
outlays in provincial public spending. In this case, results
availed the idea of higher accountability and transparency in
spending decisions stemming from a greater weight of own
taxes in total fiscal revenues.
• The results for financial sufficiency (SUFIN) as an explanatory
variable were, in context of the analysis of public spending
categories’ performance, far from being satisfactory as only in
two regression equations coefficients were statistically significant.
Nevertheless, its negative impact upon economic spending
participation may be somehow implying a discouraging effect
upon economic spending’s current content resulting from
SUFIN’s fiscal effort component.
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• Increases in the stock of public debt boosted current public
spending while in turn shrank capital and economic public
spending. This brought to surface not only the impact of the
financial burden (represented by interest payments) but also the
fact that the use of credit by provincial governments did not
accomplish the expected role of forming capital stocks.
• Strikingly, and contrariwise to what was generally assumed, gross
geographic product and categories of provincial public spending
did seldom appear related, possibly due to a proportionally lesser
public goods demand (scale effects) as product grew or for the
reason that gross geographic product was in this context better
represented by budgetary variables, as for instance tax collection.
Let it however be stressed that results showed a negative impact
of gross geographic product upon participation of social public
spending, which can be interpreted as provinces been able to
switch resources from attention to the poor to other spending
categories since the expansion of the product helped to reduce
poverty.
• On the other hand, the not existing relationship between gross
geographic product and public capital formation’s share, despite
what could normally be expected, had already been observed
in the analysis for other countries and seemed to be depicting a
situation in which –in the short run- private and public capital
formation crowded out each other as they behaved like substitutes.
• With regard to categorical variables, their econometric performance
fell in general short of yielding conclusive results; however, clear
statistical evidence was found that operating limits on public debt
served the purpose of reducing current, consumption and social
public spending participation in provincial spending. Likewise,
the empirical analysis showed that constitutional and legal
constraints placed upon the use and ends of resources from credit
clearly tended to enhance capital formation and economic spending’s
share of total to the detriment of other expenditure categories.
• The downsian-like behaviour and economic business cycle patterns,
based on the idea of expansive spending programmes incurred
by governments in electoral years, did not find support in estimations
as coefficients of variables standing for governors’ reelection
possibility (D2 and D3) did not appear statistically significant in
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any spending category, nor the hypothesis of governments’ fiscal
discipline once reelection is achieved (D4). Nevertheless, the
possibility of political budget cycles taking place at the
Argentine provincial level can not be ruled out at once since
they still might have happen with regards to provincial spending
levels (total or by categories) as roughly suggested by table 3
and figure 3 in Section III.
• The assumption could not either been proved that provinces
tended to reduced certain spending categories when they shared
the central government’s same political sign (hypothesis of fiscal
discipline being imposed from above). The only case in which
this variable resulted statistically significant was with consumption
expenditure participation in total spending as the dependent
variable and the coefficient held not the expected sign.
• Also, and contrariwise to what was asserted in related papers
about legislatures’ assumedly influence upon provincial public
spending, only very weak or nil evidences were found backing
the assumption that bicamerality’s checks and balances influenced
the participation of diverse spending categories within total
provincial spending.
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